"Democracy cannot be imposed by military force" - Former NL ambassador to Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia and Germany
Nikolaos van Dam (75)
CAREER
2020: Book publication: Granaten en minaretten. Een diplomaat op zoek naar vrede in de Arabische en islamitische wereld
2017: Book publication: Destroying a Nation. The Civil War in Syria
2015 – 2016: Ambassador | Special Envoy for Syria
2005 – 2010: Ambassador of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to Indonesia & Timor Leste
1999 – 2005: Ambassador of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to Germany
1996 – 1999: Ambassador of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to Turkey & Azerbaijan
1991 – 1996: Ambassador of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to Egypt
1988 – 1991: Ambassador of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to Iraq
1976: Entry into foreign service
THE AMBASSADOR SERIES (BONUS EPISODE): THE MIDDLE EAST
In The Ambassador Series, Teer Strategy explores the future of the Netherlands in a rapidly changing geopolitical arena. The world is in flux. Small and mid-sized countries are challenged in this movement. I ask four former ambassadors posted respectively in New Delhi, Washington, Moscow and Beijing:
HOW CAN THE NETHERLANDS REMAIN A PROSPEROUS COUNTRY WITH AN OPEN SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
The ambassadors reached consensus on one key theme: Western military interventions and attempts to nation building in the Greater Middle East failed. This week, I speak with Nikolaos van Dam about American-led attempts to reshape the world during the post-Cold War unipolar moment, which is now coming to an end.
When have military intervention and regime change wars failed?
Military interventions in the Middle East have generally failed miserably. They did not only bring disasters to the attacked countries concerned, resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, and prolonged bloody armed conflicts which turned countries to a great extent into ruins; but they also led to a destabilization of the region as a whole.
Clear examples are the Iraqi military intervention in Kuwait (1990), the toppling of the regime of president Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the American-British occupation of the country (2003), as well as foreign military interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen.
These interventions, more often than not, resulted in the opposite of what the intervening countries wanted to achieve. The US-British occupation of Iraq resulted in strengthening the position of Iran in the region, including in Iraq itself. The toppling of Saddam Hussein created the opportunity for al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to become powerful and dominant in extended regions, both inside Iraq, as well in Syria and several African countries. Large scale Turkish support for the military opposition forces in Syria provided the Syrian Kurdish forces of the PYD/YPG with the opportunity to take control over large parts of the north of the country. This, in turn, led to a potential strengthening of the Kurdish sister organization of the PYD in Turkey: the PKK, which is branded as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.
How about those interventions with the aim for a new democratic government to take power in the occupied countries?
If the aim had been to help create democracies, it was a great failure as well. Various intervening countries maintained that they wanted democracies in specific countries with regimes they strongly disliked (like those in Iraq, Libya and Syria), whereas on the other hand they preferred to condone authoritarian regimes in countries which they considered as their allies (like Bahrein, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates pretended to support the rise of democracy in Syria, while forbidding democratic developments at home. They, actually, supported Islamist organizations in Syria which rejected democratic ideas.
Toppling the regime of the Libyan leader al-Qadhafi gave rise to many years of bloody war. Whereas African workers earlier on could find relatively well-paid jobs in Libya, sub-Saharan Africans were afterwards sold as slaves in the country. Furthermore, the Libyan barrier for African refugees and migrants looking for a better future in Europe was largely removed. The implementation of the UN principle of Responsibility to Protect failed in Libya, because the intervening countries withdrew prematurely once al-Qadhafi had been toppled and killed.
“Knowing in advance that maintaining a military presence for ten to twenty years would be too high a price for intervening countries to pay, it would have been better for them not to intervene at all.”
In order to turn the principle of Responsibility to Protect into a success, the intervening countries should have stayed on, so as to lead Libya into (what they considered to be) a ‘better future’. This could have implied that they would have had to stay in Libya for another ten to twenty years, if not longer, at the cost of many victims for the intervening countries themselves. Knowing in advance that this would be too high a price for intervening countries to pay, it would have been better for them not to intervene at all.
When – if ever – has military intevention succeeded? How about NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo and Saddam’s expulsion from Kuwait by forces of a coalition including from Arab states such as Egypt and with UNSC approval?
One should make a distinction between various types of foreign military interventions. First, there are military interventions by countries in other countries against regimes which are not really a threat to the intervening countries. Examples of this type are the military interventions of Iraq in Kuwait (1990), of the US and the UK in Iraq (2003), Syria (in the form of a war by proxy from 2011 onwards), Libya (2011), and Saudi and Emirati interventions in Yemen (2015 and onwards). Various of these wars have developed into wars by proxy. None of the regimes of Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Syria, or Yemen constituted a serious danger or threat to the countries that invaded them. These interventions have all failed to bring positive results, regardless of whether they resulted in regime changes.
Second, there are military interventions as a reaction to other countries’ military interventions and occupation. A good example is the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait by an American-led coalition in 1991. This was a successful operation. It was a matter of ending a foreign occupation, by liberating the country involved.
“More resoluteness in intervening in the specific case of NATO intervention in Bosnia would have been better.”
Third, there were the NATO military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. These might be considered as successful, although there were also serious failures, such as the lack of sufficient military intervention in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, which led to the massacre by Bosnian Serbs of approximately 8,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians. It should also be taken into consideration that it took over four years to end this war in the ‘backyard’ of Europe, with 100,000 dead and two million refugees and homeless people as a result, which is much longer than would have been necessary. It was the hesitation of the international community, presented in the United Nations, which mainly caused the delays in intervention, also in Srebrenica. Therefore, more resoluteness in intervening would have been better in this specific case. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo can be considered as a success, because it justifiably addressed the plight of Kosovar Albanians of whom many were in danger of being ‘ethnically cleansed’.
NATO’s Bosnia and Kosovo operations were a type of foreign military intervention in a war with the aim of preventing further bloodshed and to oblige the warring parties to come to a peaceful solution, which they successfully did. It was not aimed at regime change in Belgrade; whose president Milosevic was needed to sign the peace agreements. Heavy NATO bombardments in Serbia, forced him to participate in the peace negotiations.
Why did some interventions succeed where others failed?
An important difference between the NATO military interventions in the Balkans, and those in the Middle East, is that the former interventions were of a much smaller sale and in a much smaller region, and therefore relatively easier to manage. They also took place within Europe and were therefore more of a direct interest to European countries than was the case with those countries further away. Another difference: the wars in the Balkans threatened the stability within Europe itself, whereas the regimes of the countries which were attacked in the Middle East did not really constitute a threat to the intervening countries. Yet another difference was that the wars in former Yugoslavia were wars of national independence, which were justified from the point of view of most Western states.
“As is well known, but apparently not always sufficiently realized by politicians, it is much easier to start a war than to end it by making peace.”
The interventions in the Middle East triggered a lot of instability, resulting in a strong increase of terrorism, as well as large flows of refugees, with many people wanting to escape the wars from which they suffered. In fact, the large numbers of refugees coming to Europe, were an indirect result of the military interventions concerned. In other words, some of the countries which later complained about the great numbers of people seeking refuge, actually had helped trigger the refugee crises themselves. As is well known, but apparently not always sufficiently realized by politicians, it is much easier to start a war than to end it by making peace.
What – from the fall of the Soviet Union onwards – drove Western leaders to intervene in conflicts and topple dictators?
A distinction should be made between countries like the United States which have huge military capabilities and engage in power rivalries so as to gain the upper hand in certain regions or even to gain hegemony worldwide, and countries that do not have similar military capacities, but contribute in the form of supportive declarations or by supporting military interventions of their more powerful allies by sending military forces on a much smaller scale.
According to retired US general Wesley Clark, the United States Pentagon had already decided a week after the 11th of September 2001 al-Qaeda terrorist attack, that Iraq was to be attacked in order to topple the regime of President Saddam Hussein without, however, giving any specific valid reasons; and a few weeks later the Pentagon apparently even planned to bring about regime changes in seven countries within five years: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. At the time the US was already bombing Afghanistan. The reasons for the planned attack on Iraq were not at all clear at the time. When the US-British military intervention in Iraq finally took place in 2003, it was based on false arguments as no weapons of mass destruction were found.
Western leaders who, directly or indirectly, caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people and enormous destruction in their efforts to implement regime changes, have not been prosecuted for their huge mistakes. They (justifiably) want dictators to be prosecuted for their war crimes and human rights violations, but not when it comes to themselves. The results of the actions of democratically elected leaders and dictators do not really differ a lot, when it comes to the disastrous results in The Middle East – even if democratically elected leaders have a much better human rights record in their own countries.
Syria has been in a state of civil war since 2011 including over half a million of casualties. Is this a consequence of a failure to intervene by the West?
Some argue, that if the West would have militarily intervened, the situation in Syria would have been much better, because there might then even have been a democratic regime in Damascus. Such an imagined prospect, however, was purely wishful thinking. In my book The Struggle for Power in Syria I have predicted 30 years before the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011, that any effort to topple the regime would result in a severe bloodbath. And for people familiar with the well-organized and strongly repressive character of the regime, it was not that difficult to predict. Had the West intervened militarily in Syria, the chances would have been very considerable that it would have resulted in a confrontation with Russia and Iran, being the main protectors of the Damascus regime.
“Most Western countries did know clearly what they did not want in Syria, namely the continuation of the Alawi dominated Ba’th regime. But they did not know what they could expect as the regime’s successor.”
The substantive military support provided by Western and Arab countries to the Syrian armed opposition groups was, moreover, not enough to really lead to regime change in Syria. They rather resulted in a prolongation of the bloody war. Most Western countries did know clearly what they did not want in Syria, namely the continuation of the Alawi dominated Ba’th regime. But they did not know what they could expect as the regime’s successor. Of course, many expressed the ideal wish of a democracy, but it was unrealistic for this to happen, taking into account the strong fragmentation of the opposition parties, most of which simply wanted to monopolize power themselves. Therefore, it could have been expected that any successor regime in Damascus would have had an authoritarian character just as well, although toppling the regime could also have led to a continuation of the bloody war within a different composition of warring factions.
Without any foreign intervention or military support for the Syrian opposition, the insurrection would probably have been harshly suppressed much earlier, resulting in fewer victims. In such a scenario it could have been argued: ‘Better an Assad regime with 10,000 dead, than an Assad regime with over half a million dead, millions of refugees and a country in ruins.’
“Democracy is not something which can be imposed by military force and interventions.”
Countries that cause regime changes in other states should bear a heavy responsibility for what comes afterwards under the motto: ‘If you break it, you own it.’ In practice, however, those countries which have been responsible for bringing about regime change, generally tend to evade their responsibilities when it comes to ‘the day after’ the regime has been toppled. Democracy is not something which can be imposed by military force and interventions.
What has American-led military intervention and regime change in the Middle East meant for the West’s standing around the world?
When taking the disastrous results of American-led military interventions in the Middle East into account, the standing of the West should have been largely eroded. The standing of the West has been severely damaged among the Arab populations. But these have little to say under the rule of their authoritarian regimes.
“As long as they did not constitute a threat to others, it would have been better not to intervene in these dictatorships.”
Many Western countries want democracy in the Middle East but would dislike the negative opinions which would be expressed towards the West, once freedom of expression would prevail. In fact, Arab public opinion about the West has already been quite negative, ever since the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were carved up into separate states under the colonial mandatory powers France, Great Britain and Italy. As long as they did not constitute a threat to others, it would have been better not to intervene in these dictatorships.
China – the new rising superpower – is opposed to military intervention even for humanitarian reasons against any regime, however grave its human rights abuses. Its leaders believe in an absolute definition of sovereignty, meaning that a government -whether democratic or not- should have absolute authority within its territorial borders. As a consequence, China’s non-interference principle stipulates states do not have a right to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. Does China’s rise upend the era of military intervention and regime change? And if so, is this a good development?
Ending the era of regime change by military means should be considered as a positive development. We may be glad if China applies its own principles of non-interference to the internal affairs of other countries. There appears to be a kind of blind spot in the eyes of many Western countries when it comes to allies and befriended countries. Can we expect any Western military interference in countries like Bahrein, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, because of their human rights abuses, some worse than others? No, certainly not. Can we expect any Western military intervention against Israel to end its illegal occupation and annexation policies and its grave human rights abuses in the Palestinian occupied territories? No, certainly not. Are there any plans to militarily destroy Israel’s nuclear capacity, which triggered other countries to go nuclear as well? No, of course not, because Israel is considered as a friendly nation, irrespective of its grave human rights abuses and lack of respect for international law. After all, the application of double standards remains an essential part of politics.
If dictators around the world no longer have to fear retaliation for grave human rights abuses, will we see a rise in the number of international crimes around the world? What might be additional unintended consequences?
The idea that dictators would commit fewer human rights abuses for fear of retaliation, is in my view to a great extent wishful thinking. It also reflects a patronizing attitude towards other states. I believe in dialogue to help improve the human rights situations in other countries. Thus far, military interventions have not generally led to improvements, but rather to the contrary, and dictators are well aware of this. They are also aware that military interventions can cost the intervening countries dearly. I don’t think the military interventions over the last thirty years have contributed to a decrease in the number of international crimes in the world, but rather the contrary. Expelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm (1991), and the protection afterwards of the Kurds in northern Iraq from the Baghdad regime, were among the few successes. Even though these military interventions did not really lead to a different behavior of the dictatorial regime in Baghdad.
“It would be better to combine idealism with a strong dose of realpolitik in the future.”
If the attitudes of Western countries towards the regimes they dislike, would be similarly applied to their friends and allies, who equally violate human rights and commit war crimes, the world might start to look somewhat better and safer. Western wishful thinking has cost many lives. It would be better to combine idealism with a strong dose of realpolitik in the future.